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Abstract
2019 marked the 25th anniversary of the introduction of Animal Law to the law 
degree at Liverpool John Moores University. This article examines changes in the 
legal protection of animals during this time and the impact this will have on research 
and scholarship in the law relating to animals. We examine whether the overall inter-
national treatment of animals has improved and how far the approach to the Ani-
mal Law curriculum should be influenced by the growth in concerns around climate 
change. In this context, we examine the development of the law of ecocide and the 
extent to which it addresses concerns around animal welfare across the globe. We 
suggest that those involved in the development of Animal Law, ethics and policy 
might usefully engage in a new vision of ecocide, which incorporates a clearer 
notion of ‘animal ecocide’. This new approach would enhance the international and 
national focus on animals in their own right, would recognise increasing knowledge 
of animal sentience and would move our responsibilities to them beyond anthro-
pocentric approaches to environmental protection. We argue that the inclusion of a 
more specific reference to animal ecocide would contribute to the development of 
Animal Law and would lead to an enhanced relationship between Animal Law and 
attempts to protect the environment.
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Introduction
A 25‑Year Review of Animal Law
This paper is the result of research undertaken in preparation for a paper delivered 
to the 2nd United Kingdom Animal Law, Ethics and Policy Conference held in Liv-
erpool in 2019.1 In 1994 we introduced a new Animal Law Course onto the law 
degree at Liverpool John Moores University. It is the most successful such course in 
the United Kingdom, having been studied by 25–120 final year students each year. 
The course was originally born out of our concerns for animal welfare in the United 
Kingdom and beyond. The aim of the 2019 conference paper, and of this resulting 
article, is to examine how the legal protection of animals has changed since 1997. In 
particular, have developments to enhance legal protection been successful in protect-
ing more animals or improving their welfare? Have new welfare threats emerged 
over time? It also led us to consider the context of current concerns for animals 
alongside those for the environment, in particular, the focus on climate change.2 This 
led us to consider how to create an enhanced link between these strongly related 
issues.
The Changing Face of Animal Welfare
The Animal Law course was originally designed around core themes of concern for 
animal welfare. The socio-legal basis of the course, and its part in the worldwide 
growth of Animal Law is explored elsewhere (Brooman 2017). However, it is use-
ful to summarise some of the areas of humans’ interaction with animals that are 
explored in the course, as these have remained largely unchanged:
• The philosophical and ethical implications of human interaction with animals
• Animal experimentation
• Wildlife law and hunting in the UK – with a focus on badgers and foxes
• The international protection of animals
• Biotechnology, animals and the law
• The EU and Animal Welfare
• Animals in Fur Farming
• Animals in Agriculture
• Legal Personhood for animals
Whilst many of the above areas show similar general tends there is insufficient 
space here to examine changes in each across the life of the course. Therefore, in 
1 A short video summary can be seen at https ://www.youtu be.com/watch ?v=a9Tdo f6QuV M&t=93s
2 A preliminary paper on this subject was delivered to the Conference on Animal Law, Ethics and Policy 
2019 hosted by Liverpool John Moores School of Law in conjunction with the United Kingdom Centre 
for Animal Law. The section on ecocide also formed part of a discussion paper for the Strathclyde Centre 
for Environmental Law and Governance at Strathclyde Law School, 2019.
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order to evaluate whether legal protection has been successful here we focus on 
three examples: animal sentience, developments in relation to whaling and the treat-
ment of wild animals in the United Kingdom.
The philosophical and ethical questions concerning animals have been heavily 
influenced by developments in our awareness of sentience. In the 1990s, scientific 
investigations of animal sentience were still emerging but there was already a sig-
nificant body of evidence that primates, in particular, possess far superior sentient 
capabilities than had previously been thought. Work on developing language com-
munication skills with primates (e.g. Koko the gorilla and Washoe the chimpanzee), 
exponentially increased our awareness of sentient capabilities of primates and raised 
more philosophical questions about our treatment of them.3 Contrastingly, during 
the 1990s these intelligent creatures were the subjects of experiments to, for exam-
ple, find a cure for Aids. The treatment of higher primates has, arguably improved 
in that their use in experiments decreased as a result of bans in the United King-
dom (1998) and the European Union 2010.4 However, the lower primates are still 
extensively used in the United Kingdom, and laboratories continue to operate at 
Oxford University, Edinburgh University, University College London, King’s Col-
lege London and Cambridge University, even though information on such testing is 
still largely kept out of the public domain.5
Discussions around the implications of our new awareness of animal sentience 
from science has moved into different areas of welfare concern. For example, there 
are grave concerns about the ability of animals to feel pain post-stunning in slaugh-
ter houses. This kind of concern reflects a notion of ‘sentience’ as the capacity to 
feel pain, which has been the subject of concern for centuries. This was a concern 
in the 1990s, and remains so today with the increased use of religious slaughter 
techniques.6
A different version of ‘animal sentience’ has continued to develop in relation to 
agricultural animals since the Brambell Report (1965). Brambell led to a general 
improvement in animal welfare by legislating for improvements in husbandry and 
the general conditions in which farm animals are kept. However, since the 1990s 
evidence about the farming of wild animals such as mink and foxes has continued 
to cause concern, as evidence has shown that they are not suitable for close confine-
ment because of their innate ‘wild’ characteristics.7 In this context, animal sentience 
is not catered for as the cages do not provide for the natural and ordinary sentient 
behaviours that would be part of these animals’ daily lives in the wild. In addition, 
evidence has emerged about the ‘culling’ of male chicks as part of the egg industry 
where male chicks are routinely shredded alive in rotating blades.8 Concerns have 
3 Rumbaugh and Washburn (2008).
4 Chatfield and Morton (2018).
5 Linzey and Linzey (2017).
6 Brooman (2016).
7 Pickett and Harris (2015).
8 See RSPCA report at https ://kb.rspca .org.au/knowl edge-base/what-happe ns-with-male-chick s-in-the-
egg-indus try/; Fioranelli et al. (2019).
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been raised that these animals never experience anything that could amount to a 
‘normal’ life and even the simplest exercise of their sentient capabilities. It has led 
some egg producers in the European Union allowing male chicks a limited life span 
and has led to calls for a ban on male chick culling in the EU.9
The work of Steven Wise, Gary Francione and David Favre,10 amongst others, 
has led to sentience being used as a basis for calling for protecting the personhood 
of animals. This area has developed significantly since the 1990s, particularly in the 
United States, leading to court cases and a growing body of support.11 Overall, it 
can be said with some justification that sentience is now one of the cornerstones of 
claims for the better treatment of animals. It has moved from a primary concern with 
the sentient capacity to feel pain, to greater claims for the inherent value of animals 
to experience a natural life, then to claims for the protection of animals in a way that 
is more congruent with protecting the personhood of human beings.
The second example takes us into the international sphere, with the effectiveness 
of control of whaling. The moratorium on whaling, introduced in 1986, is consid-
ered to be one of the most effective international efforts to protect animals.12 Unreg-
ulated killing reduced whale numbers to a fraction of that before mass industrial-
ised whaling began. In the early 1980′s television news often showed confrontations 
between whalers and animal rights activists and the subject was in the public eye. 
Evidence of slow deaths, combined with evidence of cetacean intelligence led to 
significant international pressure being placed on whaling nations, including threats 
to trade.13 These welfare concerns and the fear of extinction of some species led to 
the International Whaling Commission imposing an immediate ban on all but sub-
sistence and scientific whaling in 1986. In the 1990′s and beyond, the leading whal-
ing nations, primarily Norway and Japan, continued to apply pressure to allow man-
aged whaling to recommence arguing that whale numbers had recovered sufficiently, 
and adding that the moratorium had only been introduced in order to allow numbers 
to increase sufficiently.14
By the time Animal Law was introduced to the legal education curriculum 
at LJMU in 1994, the debate on whaling had settled into a permanent stand-off 
between anti-whaling nations and a small number of pro-recommencement antago-
nists. The IWC, meeting bi-annually, frequently debated recommencement of whal-
ing with growing number of countries supporting this—often under the suspicion 
that Japan had been offering economic support in return for votes.15 However, the 
moratorium held firm until the 2014 Australia v Japan whaling case in the Inter-





16 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening), International Court of Justice 
(31 March 2014), available at https ://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/148.
9 https ://globa lnews .ca/news/64207 54/male-chick -culli ng/
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harvest of whales for ‘scientific research’ was both unnecessary and a cover-up 
for the re-introduction of whale meat into the Japanese markets.17 Lacking powers 
to implement sanctions, the decision was left for Japan to comply. In 2018 Japan 
announced that it would be leaving the IWC, effectively ignoring the International 
Court decision, and recommencing industrial whaling, which it did in July 2019. As 
we write in 2020, Japan’s actions following this decision remain unclear as does any 
response by anti-whaling nations. There is also evidence that the Japanese public 
opinion is divided on support for whaling and the chief driver is actually govern-
ment enthusiasm for the resumption of whaling.18 Despite whale meat appearing in 
the sushi bars of Tokyo its consumption has dropped from 200,000 tonnes a year in 
the 1960s to 5,000 tonnes.19 The overall situation across 25 years remained tense but 
broadly static in the IWC, with whale numbers increasing. However, the withdrawal 
of Japan from the IWC, and the apparent recommencement of commercial whaling, 
is a significant threat to the welfare of whales in the South Atlantic.20
The final example is the situation regarding two wild animals in the United King-
dom—foxes and badgers. Concern for the welfare of these animals goes back some 
time.21 Foxhunting has been the subject of intense debate that pitted the Country-
side Alliance of farmers, hunters and land-owners against a disparate opposition 
that sees it as an unnecessary sport with no justifiable benefits.22 The election of 
a Labour government in 1997 committed to legislating to control fox-hunting led 
to a seven-year battle to determine a legislative formula. The Burns Inquiry23 led 
to the Hunting Act 2004 that marked a significant moment for the hunting of wild 
animals in the UK. Whilst its basis was clearly the welfare of animals in the chase, 
the outcome was more of a compromise than might have been anticipated by the 
anti-hunting lobby—hunting still continues but with severe restrictions on how foxes 
can be killed. It has led to numerous convictions and so has been lauded by non-gov-
ernmental agencies such as the RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cru-
elty to Animals), as at least a partial success.24 However, the number of convictions 
(around 350 by 2020) leads to competing claims that the 2004 Act is successful and 
on the other hand that the number of convictions show contempt for the legislation 
from the hunting community.25 Whether the welfare of foxes has improved is far 
from clear and the historic debate has moved from the need to legislate to competing 
calls for the complete abolition or re-design of the legislation.
Legal protection of badgers in the twenty-first century sees a very different pic-
ture emerge from that of 1994 when we began teaching Animal Law. At that time the 
public attention was on the digging of badger setts for the purpose of fighting them 
17 Telesetsky et al. (2014).
18 Butler-Stroud (2016).




23 Burns et al. (2000).
24 RSPCA (2015).
25 RSPCA (2020).
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with dogs. Public concerns led to the Protection of Badgers Act 1992 that made it 
illegal, for example, to dig up setts or to cause a dog to enter a sett—it was clearly 
an Act aimed at preventing a violent form of abuse against badgers. However, the 
welfare protection of badgers has been severely compromised in the intervening 
years with the government sanctioned cull.26 This highly controversial scheme has 
led to the licensed destruction of tens of thousands of animals in ethically controver-
sial circumstances. The aim was to reduce the transmission of tuberculosis between 
badgers and cattle which is claimed to affect the economic viability of cattle farm-
ing in the UK—but the evidence of transmission and the effectiveness of the cull 
have both been heavily criticised. Opponents have vociferously contested the science 
of the cull and argued that other methods such as vaccination are a moral impera-
tive.27 Without making a judgment on the relative merits of the arguments here, it 
is safe to say that inclusion of a licensing get-out clause in the 1992 Act led eventu-
ally to government-sanctioned badger slaughter on a much larger scale than was the 
case in the 1990s. In March 2020 the government stated that the badger cull would 
be phased out in favour of vaccination.28 However, given the numbers of badgers 
already culled it is difficult to argue with the contention that the welfare situation for 
badgers is much worse in the twenty-first century than it was in the last.
To summarise the changing picture of 25 years of Animal Law, and in the context 
of the best efforts of a large animal welfare community, the success of developing 
better legal protection of animals has been extremely mixed. Our state of knowl-
edge about animal suffering and awareness is greatly enhanced, but we suggest that 
this is not reflected in the law. The number of animals killed in ethically dubious 
practices carried out as a matter of course against them is shocking and shows that 
ethical arguments for animals have been met with stern opposition, entrenched prac-
tices, and government intransigence. The emergence of political/social earthquakes 
such as Brexit 2016 and the Coronavirus pandemic 2020, along with rising demand 
for pharmaceuticals, has led to concerns over future trade agreements and the quest 
for scientific advance using animals taking precedence over concern for animal wel-
fare.29 There are some notable exceptions such as the growth in veganism, changes 
to egg and veal production that show some movement towards better welfare. But 
this is counterbalanced by concerns over the fate of animals in agriculture, science 
and the wild. Humans continue to destroy animals claiming it as a natural right or a 
necessity.
The purpose of the remainder of this article is to discuss whether part of the 
answer to the question of how best to improve the welfare and standing of animals 
lies in a greater alignment between the debates over sentience and personhood of 
animals on the one hand, and concerns over climate change on the other.
26 McCulloch and Reiss (2017).
27 McCulloch and Reiss (2017).
28 Carrington (2020).
29 Sparks and Brooman (2017).
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The Proposal for an International Law of Ecocide
Whilst it can be argued, that animal law is a separate discipline to environmental law, 
the impact of environmental issues on animals cannot be ignored. There is a lot of 
legislation protecting individual animals from cruelty or harm, or protecting species 
from extinction, but many of these issues are in fact being caused by environmental 
harm or the impact of climate change. The loss of large numbers of animals in the 
Australian bush fires of 2019 is an example.30 More recently, residents of some parts 
of the United Kingdom experienced the loss of pets due to catastrophic floods.31
Nikhil Advani, senior program officer for WWF’s climate change adaptation pro-
gramme states:
Conservation biology has traditionally focused on historic threats to species, 
like habitat destruction and overexploitation. And while addressing those threats 
remains vital, it’s becoming increasingly clear that we need to understand how 
climate change could harm the various species we’re trying to protect.32
Law, in the form of regulations, treaties and domestic legislation provides for a 
measure of protection of individual species and habitat. However, climate change has 
brought with it a new set of challenges and has been described as a “super-wicked” 
policy problem.33 This arises from the fact that it is less manageable over time, its 
effects are seemingly only going to get worse, and it is compounded by the fact that 
those that are best able to address it are those who primarily cause it. No institution 
has global jurisdiction or authority to deal with what is a global issue, and solving 
the crisis remains in the hands of individual governments.34 Attempts to deal with 
this complicated problem are also hampered on a national level by deregulation, vol-
untary compliance and underfunded regulatory bodies, which can lead to regulatory 
capture, poor self-reporting and trivialisation of the issues through a lack of effective 
enforcement action.35 It is also exacerbated by the fact that efforts to mitigate or adapt 
to climate change are seen as “expensive, unnecessary, futile and remote from poli-
cies that yield immediate and politically popular economic benefits”.36
There are also general problems with climate change litigation, such as justi-
ciability in relation to standing and the separation of powers. There is the question 
of whether the courts are the appropriate bodies to hear and resolve questions of 
equity, rights and obligations in relation to climate change or whether it is a politi-
cal issue for the legislature. Much of the litigation is based on constitutional provi-
sions,37 or can piggy-back onto human rights issues (right to health/life/ freedom of 
30 Zhou (2019)
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conscience)38 refugee law,39 statutes or common law. If an issue cannot be dealt with 
under these headings, courts can be wary of expanding their remit and are accused 
of overstepping their powers by, effectively, legislating.40
Despite these limitations, there has been a significant amount of climate change 
litigation. The Climate Change database for 2019 records 294 cases against gov-
ernments and 29 against companies worldwide, with a further 723 in the USA, 
often based on the doctrine of public trust. Litigation remains an important tool to 
push policy makers and market participants to develop effective means of climate 
change mitigation.41 However, despite the growth in climate change litigation the 
fact remains that there are limits to the effectiveness of the legal control of climate 
change. Much of the law is reactive, taking place after damage is caused and when 
it is difficult to remedy, as in the Niger Oil case.42 This case saw Shell accepting 
responsibility for significant environmental damage, but the tragedy was that it 
could, and should, have been avoided. National civil law based actions such as those 
in negligence or nuisance do not prohibit, prevent or pre-empt damage and have 
the built-in limitation of reaching only common law jurisdictions.43 The conflict of 
interest that arises from the challenge of climate change means that national law is 
inadequate to deal with the global nature of the crisis.
In light of these limitations and gaps in extant provision, a conclusion was set out 
by the late Polly Higgins that we need to turn elsewhere—to international crimi-
nal law and a law on ecocide. When the lack of progress on animal welfare is also 
considered, we conclude that this should be accompanied by the addition of animal 
ecocide into this emerging new doctrine.
Issues in Defining and Implementing a Crime of ‘Ecocide’
In 2010, the late Polly Higgins44 proposed an amendment to the Rome Statute45 of 
the International Criminal Court (1998)46 to include a crime of ecocide in order to 
38 Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment) 
Case C/09/456,689/HA ZA 13–1396 (English translation) See the case commentary by Pocklington D, 
Environmental Law and Management/2015 - Volume 27/Issue 2, 1 October/Case Notes/Climate change 
and human rights–the Urgenda case – (2015) 27(2) ELM: 61.
39 Lyons (2020). https ://tbint ernet .ohchr .org/_layou ts/15/treat ybody exter nal/Downl oad.aspx?symbo 
lno=CCPR%2fC%2f127 %2fD%2f272 8%2f201 6&Lang=en.
40 UN (2017) 27–39.
41 https ://clima tecas echar t.com/.
42 Konne (2014).
43 UN (2017) 34–6.
44 Higgins (2012) 61.
45 The Rome Statute is the governing document for the International Criminal Court and covers crimes 
against peace. These are “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”, 
over and above all other laws. It covers crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and crimes of aggression. https ://www.icc-cpi.int/resou rceli brary /offic ial-journ al/rome-statu te.aspx https 
://legal .un.org/icc/statu te/romef ra.htm.
46 UN General Assembly,  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 
17 July 1998,  ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6,  available at: https ://www.refwo rld.org/docid /3ae6b 3a84.
html [accessed 14 May 2020].
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address the anomaly that, outside periods of war, it is not a crime to cause mass 
destruction or loss of ecosystems.47 In the proposed amendment to the Rome Stat-
ute, ecocide would become a new Crime Against Peace. Higgins, Short and South 
define ecocide as:
…the extensive damage to, destruction or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given terri-
tory, whether by human agency or by other causes to such an extent that peace-
ful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been or will be severely 
diminished.48
This built on the work undertaken by Mark Allen Gray,49 and there is an ongo-
ing campaign to include the crime of ecocide in international law. The prosecution 
of a crime of ecocide has been tested in a mock trial in the UK Supreme Court to 
test how it would work in practice.50 At the ICC 2019 annual assembly, three pacific 
islands and the campaign for ecocide held a panel event on the official assembly 
programme discussing the role of the ICC in prosecuting ecocide.51 The arguments 
have been set out elsewhere52 and so just a brief outline of the law will be provided 
here.
The first argument for an international crime of ecocide is it removes the enforce-
ment of environmental law from the domestic arena. An example can be seen in the 
outwardly positive development that ten countries have introduced a law on ecocide 
although this advance has been undermined by the fact that many of these countries 
suffer from corruption.53 Higgins et al. suggest that an addition to the international 
criminal code would facilitate the potential effectiveness of international law in pre-
venting crimes against the environment.54 Another advantage Higgins et al. set out 
is the ability to take pre-emptive action via an international criminal law of ecocide 
that is preventative, moving us from a principal of the polluter paying to one where 
the polluter does not pollute at all.55
53 Grechenkova (2017).
54 Higgins et al. (2013) 263–4.
55 Higgins et al. (2012).
47 Higgins et al. (2013).
48 Higgins et al. (2013) 257.
49 Gray (1996).
50 https ://ecoci delaw .com/the-law/mock-trial /, https ://sites .googl e.com/site/34992 4e64e 68f03 5/issue -4/
ecoci de-mock-trial -case-comme nt.
51 https ://www.stope cocid e.earth /.
52 Higgins et al. (2013).
210 D. Legge, S. Brooman 
1 3
When such a change is viewed alongside other types of enforcement such as those 
mentioned above and the soft law of other International agreements such as the 
Paris Agreement,56 those pushing for a crime of ecocide highlight the potential for 
a greater impetus for changing behaviour. It contains the added ingredient of being 
based on restorative justice, providing for the restoration of what has been lost rather 
than applying a punishment to the perpetrator.57 In effect, a law of ecocide would 
help prevent and prohibit human-based damage, and could take greater account of 
natural catastrophes. The route to bringing a case would be through national courts 
and/or the International Criminal Court, and this would provide a legal duty of care 
so opening the possibility of holding governments and corporations to account.58
The choice of whether to protect habitats, the environment more widely or spe-
cies is also affected by emerging conversations centred on rights. Arguments for 
attributing rights to animals or granting them personhood have a long history,59 but 
there have been more recent collateral moves towards ascribing rights to nature.60 In 
addition to legal personhood becoming a large area of research in Animal Law61 and 
Environmental Law, and a significant backdrop to a law of ecocide,62 there is also 
discussion around the notion of creating a specific area known as Wild Law63 under 
the ambit of Earth Jurisprudence.64 The proposal for a law of ecocide recognises 
many of the notions intrinsic to these new ways of thinking about protecting the 
environment through law—that we are all inhabitants of the earth and that our inter-
connectedness with nature is central to understanding how we can survive. These 
conversations mark a significant increase in the output of legal scholars into discus-
sions about law’s relationship with the holistic ecosystem, and sits within the ideas 
of Gaia theory,65 the web of life66 and ecocentrism.67 It seems that the legal acad-
emy has realised the need to contribute to discussion about how law can help reverse 
the damage of anthropocentrism which, it is argued, has caused a radical discontinu-
ity between human and other forms of nature/being.68 Ecocide joins these new con-
versations as a way in which humans could develop a greater connection between 
law and issues such as climate change. It helps us to find new ways of thinking about 
our existence and that of other species such that we can begin to solve issues rather 
than merely punish perpetrators, as well as providing a practical route by which this 
56 https ://unfcc c.int/proce ss-and-meeti ngs/the-paris -agree ment/the-paris -agree ment.
57 Rivers (2012).
58 Higgins et al. (2013) 264.
59 Brooman and Legge (1997) chapters 1 and 3.
60 Eckstein et al. 2019.
61 Giménez-Candela Derecho (2018) 5–28.
62 Naffine (2012) 68–83.
63 Burdon (2010); White, (2014).
64 Cullinan (2010) and (2011).
65 Lovelock (2000).
66 Capra (1996).
67 Kopnina et al. (2018) 140–148.
68 Kopnina et al. (2018).
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could be achieved. It leads us to question the role of law in determining and defining 
a new relationship between humans, animals and the environment.
A change in the law to incorporate an international law of ecocide would provide 
not just moral but legally enforceable norms to address the balance whereby law 
tends to focus on human interests over the natural world.69 This issue is discussed 
by Capra and Mattei, who argue that it is the system of law itself that is the prob-
lem as it focuses on private ownership, capital and state sovereignty and that what 
is needed is a law of ecology based on social and natural relations and community 
ownership.70 But most importantly a wider notion of ecocide helps us debate issues 
outside of narrow confines, and revealing the interconnectedness of the law and 
issues such as climate change. It can help us take a wider view of issues such as the 
effect of having pets, of veganism, of the loss of top soil, or of farming on the wider 
environment, which need new thinking and new action in order to be able to solve 
the issues. Ecocide may also help us debate new issues and challenges such as gene 
modification and the farming of insects as food.
In the context of a changing climate there are no simple solutions to the moral 
dilemmas arising from our relationship with animals. Criminal actions might go 
through a number of routes, some of which might not necessarily be tackled through 
an action based on harm to the animal. Farm animals, for example, have a significant 
impact on climate change through their emissions71 and the welfare of such animals 
is also of serious concern. However, it could be argued that the industry might be best 
held to account through the damage it causes to the environment with these emissions 
and the loss of habitats when land is cleared for livestock production.72 Environmen-
tal damage is highly visible and of immediate concern to those who live with it.
We accept that the practicalities of introducing this new international crime leave 
some issues to be resolved. Anastasia Greene supports the need to address ‘the mas-
sive problem of environmental destruction’,73 but suggests that the definition pro-
posed by Polly Higgins is too broad and does not sit comfortably within the cur-
rent ambit of the International Criminal Court, because of its lack of environmental 
expertise. She suggests that a new forum, a specialised international court, may be 
needed. Despite these doubts, there is a great deal of momentum behind the need 
to create greater accountability for environmental destruction which continues to 
attract considerable support. The proposal would give greater weight to enforcement 
rather than seeing states continue to water down the ineffective diplomatic efforts to 
prevent long-lasting devastation.74
69 Higgins et al. (2013) 256.
70 Capra and Mattei (2015) 197.
71 Grant (2019).
72 Cameron and Cameron (2017).
73 Greene (2018) 47.
74 Lay et al. (2015)
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The Case for Including a specific crime of Animal Ecocide
What place might the protection of animals have in this new law of ecocide? Some 
of the prime movers of this new doctrine have mentioned that harm to animals 
should be included in the realm of potential actions. Higgins et  al. suggest that 
examples of environmental harms and crime should include crimes/harm against 
animals/non-human species, such as: ‘abuse, mistreatment or death of animals and 
birds’ by war, catastrophe, oil spills, deforestation, medical experiments, farming, 
clearance of land for development, water and air pollution, soil erosion, climate 
change, wildlife trafficking and scientific advances.75 This highlights a weakness as 
far as animals are concerned, as whilst animals are mentioned in the argument, the 
protection afforded to animals is tied up in the language of protecting the environ-
ment and human interests:
‘Abuse, mistreatment or death of animals and birds may be visible and stark 
as in cases of destruction of habitats by war, catastrophe, oil-spills, deforesta-
tion, or be less visible and socially accepted when related to farming, medi-
cal experiments, clearance of land for building, or where damage results from 
activities that cause air or water pollution, soil-erosion or climate change.’ 
(Higgins et al 2013 253).
We agree with the sentiments of this definition of ecocide, in that such a connec-
tion with environmental damage is often very much associated with collateral dam-
age to the environment, however we suggest that tying the fate of wild animals so 
closely to environmental concerns mask issues that relate to animals alone in light of 
their sentient capacities.
A definition which gave more prominence to animal sentience would accord with 
notions of personhood that have become highly defined in the twenty-first century. It 
would protect animals in their own right, not by reason of their being members of a 
species, and it would recognise their right to live life according to their species and 
give them freedom from unnecessary pain. We suggest a definition as follows, which 
draws on the definition of ecocide that was presented by UK lawyer Polly Higgins to 
the United Nations Law Commission in 2010:
Animal Ecocide is the unnecessary killing or slaughter of a wild or wild-
caught animal, by any human agency, or allowing such killing or slaughter 
to be so caused by any governmental organisation, to such an extent that an 
animal, or group of animals, lose their sentient capacity to live a natural life 
according to their species.
Just as with claims in the area of environmental ecocide it would be possible for 
international animal protection organisations to bring actions for crimes against 
those species leading to the build-up of precedent in the area regarding definitions 
of ‘unnecessary’ etc. This would allow new and existing scientific evidence to be 
75 Higgins et al. (2013) 253–4.
213
1 3
Reflecting on 25 Years of Teaching Animal Law: Is it Time for…
brought to court and a legal standard of proof to be applied to what often passes as 
acceptable behaviour by government decree.
In this claim to draw on the definition of ecocide to develop one for animal eco-
cide we would argue there should be a distinction between wild and kept animals. 
Animals kept for farming, experimentation, pets and entertainment are already cov-
ered by legislation that, whilst it needs to be strengthened, e.g. by greater penalties 
for abuse or restrictions on their use in experiments, does provide a measure of pro-
tection. It also avoids dampening potential action by re-heating arguments around 
the moral case for eating animals where the meat industry becomes extremely defen-
sive and argues necessity.76 This article suggests that it is in the area of wild animal 
welfare that the call for a crime of animal ecocide would significantly advance the 
welfare for animals and not get caught up in matters of domestic control/existing 
provision. The international surge in concern over climate change and destruction of 
the environment could provide an opportunity for those calling for different attitudes 
to other species and/or better welfare for animals to join voices. We suggest that 
this could be done by modifying calls for an international law of ecocide to include 
a clearly identifiable definition of animal ecocide, which might provide a collateral 
advantage of creating a stronger claim for the law of ecocide more generally.
Animals are sentient creatures with lives that exist beyond their usefulness to 
humankind or any connection with the environment. Indeed, some issues that we 
contend would be covered by a specific animal-centred definition of ecocide would 
not necessarily be covered by the current definition of ecocide. An example of this is 
whaling, where the suffering of animals is paramount beyond the potential environ-
mental impact of the loss of species. We draw on the arguments put forward for the 
personhood of animals to assert that just as humans are protected against unneces-
sary pain not because of their membership of a species, so it should be now for some 
animals such as the primates, whales and dolphins. These highly sentient creatures 
should be accorded a similar right to life and freedom from, for example, torture or 
oppression. We suggest that a definition of animal ecocide would outlaw all forms 
of whaling beyond those for subsistence of some humans in the far-reaches of cold 
areas of the planet.77 In the vast majority of cases, the killing of whales, porpoises 
and dolphins would amount to animal ecocide—it is a practice that has no reason-
able scientific justification and involves the unnecessary infliction of pain on highly 
sentient creatures where alternative sources of science and/or food are available. 
This would also help to highlight the impact fishing, ship strikes and plastic pollu-
tion78 are having on whales, leading to loss of life.79
Such a definition of animal ecocide could also give rise to potential actions 
against governments for allowing the unnecessary suffering of wild domestic 
76 Despite this pragmatic step, we maintain our commitment to the moral case for veganism.
77 We do not condone such use of whales for subsistence but recognise that this is a difficult decision 
weighing up human and animal rights where the current situation has no easy resolution. Such extreme 
difficulties of resolving conflicting human and animal interests do not occur in other examples that would 
be covered by Animal Ecocide.
78 Ellenby (2019).
79 Bergman (2020).
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species. An example is the highly contentious cull of badgers in the United King-
dom. This sort of activity might be covered by the existing definition of ecocide—
but it would certainly be covered by a new definition of animal ecocide. The case 
would come down to the competing claims of farmers/government—i.e. that this 
is a necessity using the best scientific methods available where no other reasonable 
alternative to protect other interests can be found, against those who argue that the 
cull is based upon dubious science and the unnecessary and inadequately controlled 
suffering of a wild species where clear alternative course of action are available. 
It could also be used to take a government to court where its legislation was con-
sidered to be inadequate to control specific animals such as the United Kingdom’s 
Hunting Act of 2004 (foxes and deer). Outside the UK it could be used to prevent, 
for example, the mass destruction of wild birds in particular those who by virtue of 
their migration routes are truly international species.
Conclusion
Conducting a review of Animal Law after 25 years of teaching presented us with 
some stark realities—the prospects for animal welfare at both national and inter-
national levels, remains precarious. We feel that this situation might be improved 
by building on the proposed law of ecocide to more specifically recognise animal 
ecocide.
As we move forward, climate change is arguably the most important factor in the 
protection of animals because of the potential harm caused through the destruction 
of ecosystems. Damage to the environment and assaults on the welfare of animals 
often go hand in hand, as illustrated by the examples of bush fires in Australia and 
flooding in the United Kingdom mentioned above. The interconnectivity of animal 
harm and environmental damage is further complicated by the fact that pet owner-
ship itself is blamed for creating environmental damage through emissions, which in 
turn adds to the potential for flooding and fire.80
As a subject for legal education, the course has had a significant impact on indi-
viduals as evidenced in very positive feedback. It evidences that students become 
more aware of the environmental and ethical issues raised by humans’ interactions 
with animals. For example:
‘I enjoyed learning about the different topics and laws surrounding animal 
welfare. Also, how relevant the topics are today and how the change in animal 
welfare may also have an impact on the environment, for example faux fur.’  3rd 
year student 2020.’
‘Exploring this module was very interesting. It highlights extremely important 
issues.’  3rd year student 2019.
Students are evidently interested and concerned by the issues raised in study-
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and environmental communities. As conversations move onto the impact of human 
activity on the planet, the links with Earth Jurisprudence, Wild Law and Environ-
mental Law will all assume much greater prominence in legal scholarship due to 
the issues raised by the Covid19 pandemic, apparently caused by faulty interaction 
with wild animals, disappearing species and universally-held concerns over climate 
change.81 It is accepted that our behaviour needs to change, and it follows that laws 
to govern human interaction with the natural world will do likewise. We suggest that 
the more specific inclusion of animal ecocide in existing proposals for an interna-
tional crime of ecocide adds to its coherence by recognising the need to protect the 
creatures that live in the wild.
We recognise that the proposal for an international law of ecocide has some dis-
tance to travel to be workable in practice and to find its appropriate home.82 How-
ever, we suggest that in developing such claims there needs to be a greater connec-
tion between the movements for animals and those for the environment. This could 
be enhanced by creating an international law of ecocide that more clearly recog-
nises the importance of animal species. The specific definitions and practicalities 
of ecocide may be in their infancy, but this does not make them less important for 
the future, on the contrary, we recognise that important movements for change have 
often started with uncertainty and moved gradually to acceptance. At one time there 
was no notion of Environmental Law, nor of Animal Law, now there are courses, 
laws, conferences, numerous organisations and governmental agencies to deal with 
both. As Mark Allen Gray said of a proposed international crime of ecocide in 1996: 
‘Criminalization will occur because it must.’ It is important that those who describe 
themselves as ‘animal lawyers’ join the conversation about the criminalisation of 
practices that inflict damage on the planet and its creatures, as well as damaging the 
environment for humans. We have explained here one way in which we think schol-
ars of animal law can join the conversation.
We suggest that our proposed definition of animal ecocide clarifies the argument 
for an international crime of ecocide as it recognises the importance of wild species 
and avoids environmental criminal codes being viewed through purely anthropocen-
tric eyes. It expands the basis of ecocide beyond human rights.83 It would contribute 
to persuading international and national law and policy makers to make the neces-
sary legal changes to ensure both a sustainable future and the protection of species 
in their own right. Our review led us to conclude that legal scholars’ concerns for 
animals, and concerns for the environment, are two sides of the same coin. Estab-
lishing an international code of environmental and animal ecocide would help to 
bridge the gap, and so assist with the protection of all animal species including our 
own.
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